Clinton, Hagel: IWR, Biden-Lugar

In Defending War Vote, Clintons Contradict Record

WASHINGTON — Bill and Hillary Rodham Clinton have repeatedly invoked the name of Senator Chuck Hagel, a longtime critic of the Iraq war, as they defend Mrs. Clinton’s 2002 vote to authorize the war.In interviews and at a recent campaign event, they have said that Mr. Hagel, Republican of Nebraska, helped draft the resolution, which they said was proof that the measure was more about urging Saddam Hussein to comply with weapons inspections, instead of authorizing combat.

Mrs. Clinton repeated the claim Sunday during an interview on “Meet the Press,” saying “Chuck Hagel, who helped to draft the resolution, said it was not a vote for war.”

“It was a vote to use the threat of force against Saddam Hussein, who never did anything without being made to do so,” Mrs. Clinton said.

But the talking point appears to misconstrue the facts.

In October 2002, Mr. Hagel had in fact been working with Senators Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, and Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, on drafting a resolution that would have authorized the war.

“The Hill” Senate Survey

The Hill has conducted a survey of US Senators who voted on the IWR as to whether or not they read the Oct 2 2002 NIE before voting.

I hope a similar survey is taken of House of Representative Members of that year.

Few senators read Iraq NIE report

Only a handful of senators outside the Intelligence Committee say they read the full 92-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s ability to attack the U.S. before voting to go to war, according to a survey conducted by The Hill.

The low interest in the classified estimate, or NIE, could offer valuable cover to the five senators seeking the presidency who acknowledged during recent debates that they did not read the complete document before the pivotal Iraq vote.

The Hill contacted all 69 sitting senators who voted on the war authorization in the wee hours of Oct. 11, 2002, as well as former senators who did so.

Twenty-two senators told The Hill that they read the document before the vote. The offices of 38 senators said they had not read the full report or could not recall, while six senators did not comment. Nine sitting senators and 21 former senators did not return repeated requests for comment (see chart).

-snip

Of the 22 senators who reported reading the full NIE, eight are Republicans and 14 are Democrats. All but one Democrat on the 17-person Intelligence Committee in 2002 recalled reading the NIE: Former Sen. John Edwards (D-N.C.) told a campaign-trail audience earlier this month that he had, but later recanted. Edwards voted to authorize war.

Edwards: “I had the information I needed. I just voted wrong.”

Edwards is a Democrat who voted for a 2002 resolution giving President Bush authority to invade Iraq. He has since apologized for the vote. He said Friday he had believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that President Bush should have been given the authority to make the invasion decision. “On both scores, it turned out I was wrong,” he said.

Edwards acknowledged to reporters that he did not read a classified report on Iraq available to members of Congress before the 2002 vote. He said he read an administration summary of the report, called the National Intelligence Estimate. He said he also talked to high-level officials of the Clinton administration.

The subject of the report arose recently amid criticism of Sen. Hillary Clinton, another Democratic presidential candidate who voted for the resolution. Clinton has declined to apologize for her vote, but has said if she knew what she knows now, she would have voted differently.

Her aides acknowledged recently that she did not read the classified report before voting for the invasion.

War critics contend the administration’s summary of the report glossed over skepticism contained in the complete document.

Edwards said Friday that he did not need to read the report because he was receiving information directly from intelligence officers as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “I had the information I needed,” he said. “I just voted wrong.”

DesMoines Register

Starting a new timeline today

I will be revising it as time goes on and as new information arises.

Sept 5 2002

CIA Director George Tenet appears before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a secret session to discuss the agency’s intelligence on Iraq. Graham and Durbin ask to see the latest NIE on Iraq and learn none exists. Tenet: “We’ve never done a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, including its weapons of mass destruction.” Graham orders an NIE be produced, but Tenet resists.

Sept 10 2002

Classified briefing by Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet to some members of Congress, including Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi from California, ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee, Rep. Robert Menendez, Sen. Dick Durbin, who are unconvinced.

Sept 11 2002

• Tenet agrees to produce an NIE after Graham sends a certified letter demanding one.
• Sen. John Edwards calls for overthrow of Saddam Hussein with or without the UN.

Sept 12 2002

Edwards gives floor speech “Iraqi Dictator Must Go” indirectly linking 9/11 to Saddam Hussein.

Sept 19 2002

• White House delivers draft resolution to Congress authorizing the president to use “all appropriate means” against Iraq; blank check to use military force anywhere in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
• LEE AMENDMENT is introduced in the House: “the United States… work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.” The resolution has twenty-six co-sponsors. [US Congress, 9/19/2002 ] The resolutions dies in the House Committee on International Relations.
• Sen. John Edwards publishes an op-ed in the Washington Post, calling Iraq “a mortal threat to our vital ally, Israel.” The State Department broadcasts Edwards’ op-ed to its embassies.

Sept 20 2002

White House submits 33-page “National Security Strategy” to Congress: ultimate objective to “dissuade future military competition”; “build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge”; “forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” The use of military force will not be reserved solely for defense. “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.”

Sept 23 2002

• Three retired four-star generals, Shalikashvili, Clark and Hoar, testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee warning that a unilateral strike against Iraq without UN approval might limit aid from allies, create more recruits for al-Qaeda and subvert long term US diplomatic and economic interests. A fourth general, Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney, urges the committee to support the use of military force against Iraq.
• Gen. Wesley Clark tells PBS Charlie Rose, “Apparently there is no smoking gun evidence.”

Sept 24 2002

Joint Committees Meeting: George Tenet and other intelligence officials brief the Senate Intelligence Committee on the upcoming 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq; in a classified briefing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, an intelligence official testified that the CIA had “concerns” about the allegations that Niger was selling uranium. Sen. Biden later refers to this meeting in his claim to have read the classified NIE. (2007).

Oct 1 2002

The National Intelligence Council, a board of senior analysts that prepares reports on crucial national security issues, completes a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. The purpose of an NIE is to provide policy-makers with an intelligence assessment that includes all available information on a specific issue so they can make sound policy decisions. Sen. Graham later writes, “It contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy.” (2005)

Oct 2 2002

In a congressional closed-door hearing, CIA Director George Tenet and his deputy John McLaughlin appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq that was released the day before. Graham orders Tenet to produce a declassified version of the NIE for public use by Congress.

Oct 4 2002

Tenet presents requested declassified NIE, a 25-page document titled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Graham later writes, “It represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version.” (2005)

The United States Senate conducts a debate:

• Senator Byrd
• Senator Kennedy
• Sen. Carl Levin gives a floor speech objecting to Bush-Lieberman IWR: authorization of unilateral force and force beyond WMD and delivery systems. He will introduce alternative resolution.

Oct 9 2002

The LEVIN AMENDMENT, introduced by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), would curtail the broad powers provided by the Bush-Lieberman War Resolution by requiring the President to first secure a UN Security Council authorization of the use of force in Iraq. It would require a second vote in the Senate pending action or inaction by the UN Security Council.

Oct 10 2002

• House of Representatives conducts Debate on the Use of Military Force Against Iraq.
• Sen. Hillary Clinton gives floor speech: “intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild … his nuclear program … given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members … apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001.”
• 09:43 AM Senate Roll Call Vote on BYRD (I) AMENDMENT. Rejected 31/66. Biden, Clinton, Dodd vote YEA. Edwards, Brownback, McCain vote NAY.
• 12:28 PM House Roll Call Vote on SPRATT AMENDMENT. Rejected 155/270. Kucinich voted NAY.
• 12:50 PM Senate Roll Call Vote on BYRD (II) AMENDMENT. Rejected 14/86. Biden, Brownback, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, McCain vote NAY.
• 2:47 PM House Roll Call Vote on KUCINICH MOTION TO RECOMMIT WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Rejected 101/325.
• 3:05 PM House Final Roll Call Vote H J RES 114: To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. Passed 296/133. Kuchinich votes NAY.
• 03:08 PM Senate Roll Call Vote on LEVIN AMENDMENT. Rejected 24/75. Biden, Brownback, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, McCain vote NAY.
• 04:48 PM Senate Roll Call Vote on DURBIN AMENDMENT. Rejected 30/70. Dodd votes YEA; Biden, Brownback, Clinton, Edwards, McCain vote NAY.

McCain, Brownback did not read Oct 1 2002 NIE

McCain and the NIE
Posted: Tuesday, June 05, 2007 7:08 PM by Mark Murray
Categories: Republican debatesFrom NBC’s Mark Murray
McCain just admitted he didn’t read the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate… Brownback said he didn’t remember reading it, either.

MSNBC First Read

New Hampshire Debate and the Oct 1 2002 NIE

I had hoped Kucinich would seize the moment at the Democratic debate in New Hampshire and make it clear whether or not he had read the Oct 1 2002 NIE. I felt sure he would have gone to the locked room and done so before voting against the IWR. But he didn’t say one way or another and he wasn’t directly asked. I will change his Yes? to No for now. Otherwise, our list remains the same.

2008 Candidates:

Biden (Read Yes; Voted Yes) (chair, Foreign Relations Committee)
Clinton (Read No; Voted Yes)
Dodd (Read No; Voted Yes)
Edwards (Read No; Voted Yes; Co-sponsored) (Intelligence Committee)
Kucinich (Read No; Voted No)
McCain (Read No: Voted Yes)

Others:

Allard (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Bayh (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Bunning (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Byrd (Read Yes; Voted No) (Armed Services Committee)
Dayton (Read Yes; Voted No)
Durbin (Read Yes; Voted No) (Intelligence Committee)
Feinstein (Read Yes; Voted Yes) (Intelligence Committee)
Graham (Read Yes; Voted No) (chair, Intelligence Committee)
Hagel (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Rep. Jane Harman (Read Yes; Voted Yes) (House Intelligence Committee)
Hatch (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Kennedy (Read Yes; Voted No) (Armed Services Committee)
Leahy (Read Yes; Voted No)
Levin (Read Yes; Voted No) (Intelligence Committee)
Mikulski (Read Yes; Voted No) (Intelligence Committee)
Roberts (Read Yes; Voted Yes) (Intelligence Committee)
Rockefeller (Read Yes; Voted Yes) (Intelligence Committee)
Shelby (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Stevens (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Warner (Read Yes; Voted Yes)
Wyden (Read Yes; Voted No)

(List updated 6/19/07 based on survey by The Hill.)

Yglesias: The Classified NIE

One issue that came up in the debate was whether or not reading the classified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq would have given Hillary Clinton and/or John Edwards a better perspective on the war. Years later, and in the heat of a primary campaign, it’s a bit hard to look objectively at that issue. But if you look at the relevant section of this 2003 Judis/Ackerman joint on the manipulation of intelligence, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they really should have read it.

We learn that Bob Graham “received a 25-page classified response reflecting the balanced view that had prevailed earlier among the intelligence agencies–noting, for example, that evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program or a link to Al Qaeda was inconclusive.” It also seems that the Senate Intel Committee “received the DIA’s classified analysis, which reflected the same cautious assessments.” Graham and Dick Durbin had been demanding an NIE on Iraq “and toward the end of September, it was delivered. Like Tenet’s earlier letter, the classified NIE was balanced in its assessments. Graham called on Tenet to produce a declassified version of the report that could guide members in voting on the resolution.” But when the declassified version came out “Graham and Durbin were outraged to find that it omitted the qualifications and countervailing evidence that had characterized the classified version and played up the claims that strengthened the administration’s case for war.”

The Atlantic Online

Rather surprising from Booman

I’ve always read Booman Tribune as having an open-minded and rational approach to looking at this political life of ours. But this entry which broils Hillary Clinton while giving John Edwards the “no problem, pal” is weird. I’m no Clinton supporter, let it be known, but the biggest difference between Clinton and Edwards on Iraq is that she didn’t co-sponsor the IWR.

In the comments section Booman says “Edwards did not tie al-Qaeda to Iraq.”

But he did tie 9/11 to Saddam, which is not so different.

“The path of confronting Saddam is full of hazards. But the path of inaction is far more dangerous. This week, a week where we remember the sacrifice of thousands of innocent Americans made on 9-11, the choice could not be starker. Had we known that such attacks were imminent, we surely would have used every means at our disposal to prevent them and take out the plotters. We cannot wait for such a terrible event — or, if weapons of mass destruction are used, one far worse — to address the clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”

“The Perfect Storm”

Before War, CIA Warned of Negative Outcomes
Analysts in 2002 Described Worst-Case Scenarios, Including Anarchy in Iraq, Global Antipathy to U.S.

On Aug. 13, 2002, the CIA completed a classified, six-page intelligence analysis that described the worst scenarios that could arise after a U.S.-led removal of Saddam Hussein: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq, a surge of global terrorism, and a deepening of Islamic antipathy toward the United States.

Titled “The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq,” the paper, written seven months before the war began, also speculated about al-Qaeda operatives taking “advantage of a destabilized Iraq to establish secure safe havens from which they can continue their operations,” according to a report about prewar intelligence recently released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The report said the CIA paper also cautioned about outcomes such as declining European confidence in U.S. leadership, Hussein’s survival and retreat with regime loyalists, Iran working to install a friendly regime “tolerant of Iranian policies,” Afghanistan tipping into civil strife because U.S. forces were not replaced by United Nations peacekeepers and troops from other countries, and violent demonstrations in Pakistan because of its support of Washington.

Before the war, while the Bush administration was putting a spotlight on the CIA’s intelligence on Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, which turned out to be wrong, it either buried or ignored the agency’s more accurate assessments of the problems that could emerge in the aftermath of regime change in Iraq, the Senate report said.

Washington Post

Surprise that Edwards didn’t read the NIE

Chuck Todd:

Hillary Clinton can be stubborn, can’t she. She won’t apologize for her vote on the war (like some Democrats want her to) and she won’t acknowledge whether it was a mistake NOT reading the N.I.E.

And now John Edwards also doesn’t believe it was a mistake that he didn’t read the N.I.E. In talking with one very knowledgable source of the Intelligence Committee inner-workings during that time period, this person expressed surprise that Edwards didn’t read the N.I.E. He had more access to it because he was on the Intelligence Committee.

MSNBC First Read